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The Next Financial Hurricane? Rethinking Municipal 
Bankruptcy in Louisiana 
I. INTRODUCTION: IS THERE A STORM BREWING? 
A combination of the recent economic recession, the declining 
housing market, and growing public pension liability concerns has 
incited significant chatter about cities and towns in financial 
crisis.1 Municipalities are struggling to pay their debts; at the same 
time, states are severely cutting funds to local governments, 
forcing them to provide essential services from their dwindling 
coffers.2 The mantra “do more with less” sounds good, but the 
reality is that many governments seem unable to cut spending or 
raise revenues sufficiently to meet their obligations.3 Across the 
nation, many cities struggling to balance their budgets are 
considering bankruptcy as a solution to the problem.4 Chapter 9 of 
the U.S. Bankruptcy Code provides relief to municipalities that can 
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 1. For the first time in history, Moody’s Rating Agency gave a negative 
outlook for the U.S. local government sector as a whole. Omer Kimhi, Chapter 
9 of the Bankruptcy Code: A Solution in Search of a Problem, 27 YALE J. ON 
REG. 351, 352 (2010). 
 2. For fiscal year 2010, 48 out of the 50 states “face[d] budget shortfalls,” 
totaling $192 billion. Helen Avery, Judgement Day Nears for the Benighted 
States, EUROMONEY, Sept. 1, 2010; see also Ameet Sachdev, Official: 
Municipal Bankruptcy Fears Overblown, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 21, 2010, at 19 
(“With states also financially strapped, lifelines to cities may dwindle and 
bankruptcy could become a more attractive option.”); Omer Kimhi, Reviving 
Cities: Legal Remedies to Municipal Financial Crises, 88 B.U. L. REV. 633, 639 
(2008). 
 3. Local governments rely on taxes for revenue, which are collected only 
once or twice a year. In order to fund projects and provide services that tax 
revenues cannot immediately fund, they issue municipal bonds. For an overview 
on why municipalities default on their debt obligations, see Kimhi, supra note 2, 
at 637–47. 
 4. Los Angeles’s former mayor suggested the city pursue bankruptcy in 
light of its fiscal woes. Rick Orlov, City Budget Crisis Bankruptcy: L.A.’s Best 
Option? Council: Some Advocates Say Filing Would Allow for Pension, Benefits 
Reform, DAILY NEWS (Los Angeles, Cal.), Apr. 11, 2010, at A1. Some city 
officials for Harrisburg, Pennsylvania have recommended the state capital file 
for bankruptcy to solve its budget deficit of $164 million over the next five 
years. Harrisburg in Crisis: A Burning Issue, ECONOMIST, Mar. 20, 2010, at 70. 
Jefferson County, Alabama, encompassing the city of Birmingham, became the 
largest municipality in history to file for bankruptcy after a settlement deal for 
the County’s $3.14 billion debt arising from a court-ordered sewer project fell 
through. Melinda Dickinson, Alabama County Files Biggest Municipal 
Bankruptcy, REUTERS, Nov. 10, 2011. 




no longer meet their financial obligations.5 Although it is a 
relatively rare phenomenon, several states, including Louisiana, 
have witnessed their cities and towns file for bankruptcy.6 
Municipal bankruptcy is a drastic measure with significant 
consequences and thus should be considered only as a last resort.7 
Although bankruptcy can give a municipality temporary relief 
from debt, it can also result in long-term economic damage and 
adversely affect its neighboring cities or even the state as a whole.8 
Recognizing the gravity of these risks, the Louisiana Legislature 
enacted conservative legislation that imposes state approval 
requirements in addition to those set forth by federal law.9 In order 
to file, the Louisiana State Bond Commission—comprised of 
numerous top state officials—must first approve the petition.10 
Even if bankruptcy is pursued as a last resort, these additional state 
                                                                                                             
 5. Only Chapter 9 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code is available to 
municipalities. 11 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2008).  
 6. In 1999, the Lower Cameron Parish Hospital Service District became 
the first and only Louisiana municipality to file for bankruptcy under Chapter 9. 
The hospital’s chief executive officer stole over $400,000 in hospital funds by 
fraudulently charging Medicare $1.4 million in falsified medical services. The 
hospital subsequently owed Medicare $8 million for the overpayments, but only 
had a liquidation value of $160,000. The hospital district emerged from 
bankruptcy a year later, at which time the residents voted to lease the hospital to 
a private management company. See Mary Chris Jaklevic, Ex-CEO Pleads 
Guilty to Medicare Fraud; La. Hospital Exec Faces Five Years in Prison for 
Bilking Medicare out of $1.4 Million, MODERN HEALTHCARE June 25, 2001, at 
15; Mary Chris Jaklevic, Bankrupt But Open: La. Hospital that Owes HCFA 
Millions Wins Reprieve, MODERN HEALTHCARE Oct. 16, 2000, at 50. 
 7. See discussion infra Part III.B.2. 
 8. The main arguments against municipal bankruptcy are summarized by 
Christopher Smith, Provisions for Access to Chapter 9 Bankruptcy: Their Flaws 
and the Inadequacy of Past Reforms, 14 BANKR. DEV. J. 497, 521–22 (1998). 
See also discussion infra Part III.B.2. 
 9. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:4741 (2006); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
39:1410.64 (2005); see also discussion infra Part IV.C. Federal law requires the 
states to enact statutes specifically granting access to Chapter 9. 11 U.S.C. § 
109(c)(2) (2006); see also discussion infra Part III.A.2. Louisiana enacted its 
municipal bankruptcy statute in 1935. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:4741 (2006). 
“Louisiana . . . ha[s] challenging approval requirements, specifically prohibiting 
Chapter 9 filings unless certain conditions are met.” Daniel J. Freyberg, 
Municipal Bankruptcy and Express State Authorization to be a Chapter 9 
Debtor: Current State Approaches to Municipal Insolvency—and What Will 
States Do Now?, 23 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1001, 1011 (1997). 
 10. The State Bond Commission is comprised of the State treasurer, 
governor, lieutenant governor, president of the senate, speaker of the house, 
secretary of state, attorney general, commissioner of administration, chairmen of 
the legislative fiscal committees and two legislators. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
39:1401(A) (2005). 




approval requirements may present significant hurdles for 
Louisiana municipal governments to overcome. 
This Comment argues that the State Bond Commission 
approval requirement is sound in theory but not in practice. 
Because municipal bankruptcy has significant political 
consequences, obtaining the State Bond Commission’s approval 
may be virtually impossible. Moreover, there is a more qualified 
person, with fewer political motivations and a more comprehensive 
understanding of the municipality’s predicament who can decide 
which filings to approve. The fiscal administrator—who is 
appointed to manage a municipality’s financial affairs during a 
fiscal crisis—is that person. This Comment posits that giving the 
fiscal administrator filing approval authority will make the 
management of municipal financial crises more efficient and 
effective and will ensure that bankruptcy is pursued only as a last 
resort. 
Part II begins with a discussion of national and local trends in 
municipal bankruptcy. Part III provides a general overview of 
Chapter 9 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code with an analysis of the pros 
and cons of the process. Part IV describes Louisiana’s laws on 
municipal debt, fiscal administration, and bankruptcy 
authorization.  Part V explores the positive and negative aspects of 
the current legislation. Following this analysis, Part VI 
recommends amending Louisiana’s legislation to authorize the 
fiscal administrator to approve a Chapter 9 filing and establishing 
statutory guidelines to assist the fiscal administrator in this 
decision. As a result of these modifications, this Comment 
envisions a more predictable and streamlined bankruptcy process 
for the municipalities of Louisiana. 
II. WILL IT BE A CATEGORY I OR CATEGORY V HURRICANE? 
A. An Almanac of Municipal Bankruptcy  
Approximately 600 municipalities have filed for Chapter 9 
bankruptcy since 1937.11 Of those cases, some of the most 
publicized involved California municipalities.12 In 2009, the city of 
                                                                                                             
 11. Compared with the 15,000 Chapter 11 bankruptcy filings in 2009 alone, 
municipal bankruptcies are relatively rare. Matt Miller, Taboo: Chapter 9, THE 
DEAL (Mar. 19, 2010, 2:00 PM), http://www.thedeal.com/newsweekly/2010/03/ 
taboo:-chapter-9/. 
 12. The most famous Chapter 9 proceeding involved Orange County, 
California. In re Cnty. of Orange, 183 B.R. 594 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1995). In 
1994, the County made headlines after its treasurer’s high-risk investment 
scheme failed due to rising interest rates. The County filed for Chapter 9 with 




Vallejo became the largest California city to file for Chapter 9 after 
it failed to meet its financial obligations.13 Facing $10 million in 
debt as a result of unsustainable government employee pension 
agreements and a debilitated tax base due to residential 
foreclosures, city officials felt bankruptcy was the only remaining 
option.14 The City’s debt counselor conceded that “Vallejo’s 
finances were so bad and its reserves so exhausted that city 
officials ran the danger of violating the law had it not filed.”15 
Unfortunately, Vallejo’s problems worsened after its discharge 
from bankruptcy. Unable to rehabilitate its image or quell concerns 
of future insolvency, the City suffered an exodus of businesses and 
residents, which has stymied its financial recovery.16 Recognizing 
the adverse consequences of municipal bankruptcy, the California 
Legislature considered an amendment to restrict access to Chapter 
9 bankruptcy in the 2010 regular session.17 
Although large cities like Vallejo tend to garner the most media 
attention, small municipalities, such as utilities and school boards, 
                                                                                                             
 
more than $1.7 billion in debt. In 1996, the court approved the debt readjustment 
plan, which called for the County to repay a more manageable, reduced portion 
of its debts. After six years of litigation, the County emerged from bankruptcy 
and has regained a respectable bond rating. See A Sobering Event: County’s 
Bankruptcy Filing Rattles Bond Market, NATION’S CITIES WEEKLY, Dec. 12, 
1994, at 1; Jennifer Grzeskowiak, Chapter 9 Bankruptcy is No Easy Option, 
AMERICAN CITY & COUNTY (Apr. 21, 2010); Jay Reeves, Alabama County on 
the Ropes: Biggest Municipal Bankruptcy Looms, FLINT JOURNAL, Aug. 6, 2008, 
at 1; Keeok Park, To File or Not to File: The Causes of Municipal Bankruptcy in 
the United States, J. PUB. BUDGETING, ACCT. & FIN. MGMT., July 1, 2004, at 
228. 
 13. Avery, supra note 2; see also In re City of Vallejo, 403 B.R. 72 (Bankr. 
E.D. Cal. 2009), aff’d, 432 B.R. 262 (E.D. Cal. 2010). Vallejo has a population 
of 120,000 and is located across the bay from San Francisco. Bob Adelmann, 
Conjuring Magic to Cover States’ Debts Fiscal Reality Sets In: State, Unlike the 
Federal Government, Cannot Print Money to Cover Their Debts, But…, NEW 
AMERICAN, Aug. 30, 2010, at 10. 
 14. J.M. Brown & Sarah Rohrs, Bankruptcy Good for City, Some Saying: 
Mortgage Crisis, Wal-Mart’s Departure Blamed for Woes that Could Leave 
Many Out of Work, CONTRA COSTA TIMES (Walnut Creek, Cal.), Feb. 23, 2008, 
at A3. 
 15. Miller, supra note 11. 
 16. Avery, supra note 2. 
 17. Rich Saskal, Clock Runs Out on California Bills, BOND BUYER, Sept. 2, 
2010, at 1. In 2010, California was the lowest-rated State in the union with 
ratings of A- by Standard & Poor, Baa1 by Moody’s, and BBB by Fitch. Here’s 
another ‘I Told ‘Ya so” for the Muni Buyers, PHIL’S STOCK WORLD (Mar. 11, 
2010), http://www.philstockworld.com/2010/03/11/hers-another-i-told-ya-so-
for-the-muni-buyers/. 




actually account for the majority of Chapter 9 filings.18 For 
example, Connector 2000, a South Carolina non-profit 
transportation district financing the construction of a toll road, filed 
for Chapter 9 in 2010 after toll revenues fell significantly short of 
expectations.19 The municipality faced almost $369 million in 
bond debt at the time of filing.20 Although cases involving small 
municipalities like Connector 2000 are more likely to arise, they 
are still considered anomalies in the bankruptcy world. Of the 1.6 
million bankruptcy cases filed nationwide in the 2010 fiscal year, 
only 12 were under Chapter 9.21 However, there has been an 
overall increase in municipal bankruptcies, especially in the last 
five years.22 In 2009, seven municipalities filed for bankruptcy, up 
from four in 2008.23 Although these numbers may seem 
insignificant at first glance, when one considers the impact that a 
single municipal bankruptcy can have on a population, the 
numbers should not be casually dismissed.24 
B. The Financial Forecast  
Connector 2000 and Vallejo illustrate the effects of the souring 
economy that have led financial analysts and economists to 
speculate that municipal bankruptcies will soon spike.25 Indeed, the 
media finds the mere mention of the word “bankruptcy” 
                                                                                                             
 18. Most municipalities that file for Chapter 9 are relatively small. The 
median population size of municipalities that filed between 1976 and January 
2009 was about 1,000. Kimhi, supra note 1, at 360. 
 19. Michael Bathon & Dawn McCarty, Connector 2000 Association Files 
Bankruptcy in South Carolina, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, June 25, 2010; 
Patrick Temple-West, Chap. 9 Plan in S.C. Hits Pothole, BOND BUYER, Aug. 
16, 2010, at 1. 
 20. See Temple-West, supra note 19. 
 21. Sachdev, supra note 2, at 18. 
 22. JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2009 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE 
DIRECTOR 24 (2009), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/ 
JudicialBusiness/2009/JudicialBusinespdfversion.pdf. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Municipal bond defaults rose from $329 million in 2007 to over $7.5 
billion in 2008. William M. VanDenburgh, Philip J. Harmelink & Edward M. 
Werner, Reevaluating State-Specific Muni Bond Funds, CPA JOURNAL, Feb. 1, 
2010, at 56; see also discussion infra Part III.B.  
 25. Moody’s Investors Service released a report in 2009 that called into 
question the credit quality of all local governments. The rating agency predicted 
increased negative ratings for municipal bonds throughout the country. 
VanDenburgh, Harmelink & Werner, supra note 24; see also Peter Benvenutti, 
et al., An Overview of Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code: Municipal Debt 
Adjustments, MONDAQ BLOG (Aug. 23, 2010), http://www.mondaq.com/united 
states/article.asp?articleid=108258. 




newsworthy.26 With the media speculating as to possible 
bankruptcies in Los Angeles27 and Detroit,28 and in light of  
Jefferson County’s recent filing,29 it is hard not to be concerned 
about the possibility of widespread governmental bankruptcy. 
Although analysts concede that there may not be significant 
increases in Chapter 9 filings in the next few years, they argue the 
perfect storm is looming just off the radar.30 This imminent 
disaster is the estimated $1 trillion in unfunded public pension 
liabilities that municipalities nationwide have amassed.31 Unlike 
private pensions, public pensions are not federally regulated nor 
are they guaranteed.32 As a result, municipalities have been “left in 
a largely unregulated vacuum, free to make their own choices” 
about how to fund and pay these benefits.33 There is a growing 
concern that local governments will fail to pay their retired 
workers the pensions they were promised and that the only way to 
avoid paying them will be to declare bankruptcy.34 
Despite the media attention, there are others who doubt the 
possibility of widespread Chapter 9 filings.35 For example, some 
municipal bond brokers and analysts have concluded that given the 
stigma associated with bankruptcy, municipalities will file only as 
a last resort.36 They conclude there is simply too much at risk 
politically. Local government officials “are slow to solve these 
                                                                                                             
 26. Before a municipality even files for Chapter 9, the media is quick to 
speculate that such a filing will in fact occur. See, e.g., Sharon Smith, Bankruptcy, 
‘Option of Last Resort,’ Might Not Hurt Harrisburg, PATRIOT-NEWS (Harrisburg, 
Pa.), Sept. 19, 2010, http://www.pennlive.com/midstate/index.ssf/2010/09/ 
bankruptcy_option_of_last_reso.html; Orlov, supra note 4 at A1. 
 27. Orlov, supra note 4, at A1. 
 28. Nancy Kaffer, Chapter 9 Among Detroit's Few Options: Budget Crisis 
Puts City in Danger of Bankruptcy, CRAIN’S DETROIT BUS., Apr. 12, 2010, at 17. 
 29. Dickinson, supra note 4. 
 30. James Chatz & Marc S. Zazlavsky, Pension Reform – The Time has 
Come, The Time is Now, MONDAQ BLOG (Sept. 3, 2010), http://www.mondaq. 
com/unitedstates/article.asp?articleid=109316; Gus Lubin, And Now, Here’s the 
First 11 State Pension Funds That Will Run Out of Money, BUS. INSIDER, (Oct. 
18, 2010), http://www.businessinsider.com/the-state-pension-funds-in-the-most-
trouble-2010-10#6-louisiana-6. 
 31. Some estimate the deficit to be as high as $4 trillion. Benvenutti, et al., 
supra note 25. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Miller, supra note 11 (quoting James Berman, debtor counsel for 
Bridgeport, Connecticut); see also Adelmann, supra note 13, at 10. 
 35. Luke Baker, et al., Municipal Bankruptcy: Chapter 9, WELLS FARGO 
BANK (Feb. 22, 2010), http://www.davieswealthms.com/new/daviesfinancial/ 
WF.%20Municipal%20Bankruptcy.%202-22-10.pdf?advisorid=331384. 
 36. Eric Young, Panel: Cities Cut More But Won’t Go Bust, S. F. BUS. 
TIMES, Mar. 10, 2010. 




problems because that would call attention to themselves as bad 
decision makers.”37 Instead of bankruptcy, analysts argue that 
municipalities will continue to make drastic budget cuts and raise 
taxes to meet rising debt obligations.38 But there is a point at which 
the municipality cannot legally cut any more expenses or raise 
taxes any higher.39 
C. Bankruptcy on the Bayou? Municipal Bankruptcy Trends in 
Louisiana  
Unfortunately, Louisiana is not immune from the economic 
threat demonstrated by national trends. Numerous Louisiana 
municipalities have experienced significant financial emergencies 
as a result of government mismanagement, fraud, large monetary 
tort judgments, and natural disasters.40 Although only one 
Louisiana municipality, a rural Cameron Parish hospital district, 
has actually completed a Chapter 9 bankruptcy proceeding, several 
other requests to file were either subsequently withdrawn or 
rejected by the State.41 
In 2005, Louisiana suffered “devastation unprecedented in 
modern U.S. history.”42 Hurricanes Katrina and Rita collectively 
                                                                                                             
 37. Miller, supra note 11 (quoting Jeffrey Cohen, a Denver-based partner at 
Patton Boggs LLP). 
 38. See Young, supra note 36. 
 39. See discussion infra Part III.B.2. 
 40. St. Landry Parish faced a financial crisis after local officials failed to 
make necessary but unpopular budget cuts. See Donald Yacoe, St. Landry 
Parish, La., to Meet Payments on Debt, Despite Being Near Insolvency, BOND 
BUYER, Feb. 19, 1992, at 2; see also discussion infra Part VI.C. The Orleans 
Parish School Board faced similar fiscal woes due to a “combination of 
ineptitude and theft.” Editorial, Taking Control, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New 
Orleans), Apr. 5, 2003, at 6. The Orleans Parish District Attorney’s Office asked 
the State to file for Chapter 9 after a $15 million judgment was cast against it. 
See Allen M. Johnson, Jr., Orleans DA Seeks State OK to File for Bankruptcy, 
ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge, La.), Jan. 6, 2009, at B2; see also discussion infra 
Part VI.C. Following Hurricane Katrina, many Louisiana municipalities had 
uncertain financial futures. See BUREAU OF GOV’T RESEARCH & THE PUB. 
AFFAIRS RESEARCH COUNCIL OF LA., MUNICIPAL BANKRUPTCY IN PERSPECTIVE 
1 (2006). 
 41. The Lower Cameron Parish Hospital Service District filed for Chapter 9 
bankruptcy in 1999. See Jaklevic, supra note 6. The Orleans Parish District 
Attorney’s Office requested to file after a $15 million judgment was rendered 
against it; but it later withdrew its request. Jim Watts, New Orleans District 
Attorney Withdraws Bankruptcy Petition, BOND BUYER, Jan. 12, 2009, at 4; see 
also discussion infra Part VI.C. Tangipahoa Parish’s request to file was rejected 
by the State in 1988. Yacoe, supra note 40, at 2.  
 42. BUREAU OF GOV’T RESEARCH & THE PUB. AFFAIRS RESEARCH COUNCIL 
OF LA., supra note 40, at 1. 




damaged or destroyed over 200,000 residences, ruined over 18,000 
businesses, and displaced over 422,000 citizens.43 Local 
governments were forced to shoulder the enormous burden of 
paying debts, providing services, and rebuilding infrastructure 
despite having lost a significant portion of their tax bases.44 
Extended emergency federal funding prevented numerous 
municipalities teetering on the brink of bankruptcy from becoming 
insolvent.45 This federal support compensated for the obliterated 
tax bases and allowed Louisiana and its municipalities to survive 
the disaster.46 In fact, Louisiana experienced unprecedented budget 
growth as a result of recovery spending.47 
Although Louisiana’s financial situation appears to have 
stabilized, it is uncertain whether these recent budgetary gains can 
be sustained. Indeed, the Public Affairs Research Council of 
Louisiana, analyzing U.S. Census Bureau data, concluded the gains 
will be short-lived.48 This means that, because the budget increases 
are merely a consequence of federal relief for an unprecedented 
environmental disaster, the economic future of Louisiana is not 
necessarily as secure as current budgetary numbers reflect.49 
Louisiana municipalities experiencing economic hardships in the 
future probably will not get this kind of federal funding to avoid 
insolvency.  
Adding to the uncertainty is the fact that Louisiana is predicted 
to exhaust its public pension fund in the next ten years.50 By 2020, 
economists predict the pension bill to be $4.3 billion, or 27% of the 
State revenue.51 The pension fund will be depleted unless the 
government can raise enough revenue to meet the rising costs.52 As 
a result, the State may no longer be able to supplement municipal 
budgets or provide economic relief during crises. If they are unable 
to operate without state financial assistance, bankruptcy may be an 
                                                                                                             
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. Then-governor Kathleen Blanco stated, “I don’t think that we’ve seen 
a catastrophic event like this before where local governments were completely 
devastated and in some cases lost their entire tax base.” Jennifer Medina & 
Christine Hauser, Storm and Crisis: New Orleans; Local Governments Face 
Bankruptcy, Layoffs or Both, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2005, at A17. 
 45. JENNIFER PIKE, PUB. AFFAIRS RESEARCH COUNCIL OF LA., STATE AND 
LOCAL REVENUE AND SPENDING: HOW LOUISIANA COMPARES POST-KATRINA 2 
(2010). 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 8. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Lubin, supra note 30. 
 51. Id.; see also Avery, supra note 2. 
 52. Lubin, supra note 30. 




option that Louisiana’s municipalities will have to consider. A 
critical look at both Louisiana’s municipal bankruptcy laws and 
Chapter 9 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code is thus warranted. 
III. THE FEDERAL “LEVEE”: CHAPTER 9 OF THE U.S. BANKRUPTCY 
CODE 
A. Chapter 9: An Overview  
1. A Brief History  
In 1934, Congress enacted Chapter 9 of the U.S. Bankruptcy 
Code to give court protection for financially distressed 
municipalities while allowing them to adjust their debts in a 
manner which enables them to continue providing essential public 
services.53 That year, municipalities throughout the nation 
struggled to maintain fiscal health as a result of the Great 
Depression.54 By 1936, over 2,000 municipalities had defaulted on 
their obligations.55 Congress originally envisioned the legislation 
as a temporary solution, but before municipalities could take 
advantage of the law, the Supreme Court ruled it was 
unconstitutional as a violation of state sovereignty.56 In 1937, 
Congress successfully redrafted the legislation to avoid violating 
the Tenth Amendment.57 However, the law remained virtually 
untouched until the 1970s when the city of New York experienced 
                                                                                                             
 53. See Park, supra note 12; see also Melanie Cyganowski, Guest Words: 
Muni World Needs to Grasp the Basics of Chapter 9, BOND BUYER, Aug. 30, 
2010, at 6. 
 54. See Freyberg, supra note 9, at 1002. 
 55. Ashton v. Cameron Cnty. Water Improvement Dist., 298 U.S. 513, 533–
34 (1936), (Cardozo, J., dissenting). 
 56. In reaching its conclusion, the Court reasoned that: 
If federal bankruptcy laws can be extended to [a municipality], why 
not to the state? If voluntary proceedings may be permitted, so may 
involuntary ones, subject, of course, to any inhibition of the Eleventh 
Amendment. If the state were proceeding under a statute like the 
present one, with terms broad enough to include her, apparently the 
problem would not be materially different. Our special concern is 
with the existence of the power claimed—not merely the immediate 
outcome of what has already been attempted. And it is of the first 
importance that due attention be given to the results which might be 
brought about by the exercise of such a power in the future. 
Id. at 530 (citations omitted); see also U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not 
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the 
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”). 
 57. U.S. v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27, 54 (1938); see also Freyberg, supra note 9, 
at 1003–4. 




an extreme financial crisis.58 To make it easier for large cities like 
New York to utilize Chapter 9, Congress amended the laws to 
remove the requirement that 51% of a municipality’s creditors 
must agree on the debt readjustment plan.59 Despite this change 
and others, very few municipalities have filed for bankruptcy to 
date.60 This is due in part to the decision of most states to restrict 
or forbid access to Chapter 9.61 
2. Requirements for Filing  
To file a bankruptcy petition under Chapter 9, a municipality 
must meet five statutory requirements.62 First, the entity must 
qualify as a municipality, defined in the Code as a “political 
subdivision or public agency or instrumentality of a State.”63 
Second, the municipality must demonstrate its insolvency.64 The 
Code describes “insolvency” as the municipality “generally not 
paying its debts as they become due” or its inability “to pay its 
debts as they become due.”65  
                                                                                                             
 58. See Freyberg, supra note 9, at 1004. 
 59. ROBIN JEWELER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33924, MUNICIPAL 
REORGANIZATION: CHAPTER 9 OF THE U.S. BANKRUPTCY CODE 3 (2007). A 
large municipality like New York City generally has hundreds, if not thousands 
of creditors. It could hardly be expected to successfully negotiate with a 
majority of its creditors. “Thus, the primary relief generally sought by a 
debtor—the breathing spell from its importuning and litigious creditors provided 
by the bankruptcy automatic stay—was unavailable when needed most by the 
beleaguered city.” COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 900.LH (Alan N. Resnick & 
Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2011).  
 60. See Freyberg, supra note 9 at 1004. Only about 600 municipalities have 
filed for Chapter 9 bankruptcy since 1937. Miller, supra note 11. 
 61. See Smith, supra note 8, at 499.  
 62. 11 U.S.C. § 109(c) (2006). 
 63. 11 U.S.C. § 101(40) (2006). Because the Code does not further define 
what entities are included within these terms, the courts have concluded that an 
entity is a “municipality” if it is subject to the control of state or municipal 
public authority. See, e.g., In re Las Vegas Monorail Co., 429 B.R. 317, 323 n.1 
(Bankr. D. Nev. 2010) (rejecting a claim by the bond insurer that the company 
was a municipality and therefore not entitled to Chapter 11 proceedings). States 
have likewise crafted their own statutory definitions in accordance with the 
jurisprudential guidance. See Park, supra note 12; Smith, supra note 8, at 516. 
 64. 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(3) (2006). 
 65. 11 U.S.C. § 101(32)(C) (2006). This imprecise language requires courts 
to make tough decisions as to whether the municipality filing under Chapter 9 is 
truly insolvent. For example, during initial bankruptcy proceedings for the city 
of Bridgeport, Connecticut, the court found the City was not insolvent because it 
had not exhausted its assets and was simply speculating as to its insolvency. In 
re City of Bridgeport, 129 B.R. 332, 338 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1991).  




Third, in order to avoid a violation of state sovereignty, each 
state must statutorily authorize its municipalities to file for Chapter 
9.66 Today, over half of the states do not have statutes granting 
their municipalities access to federal bankruptcy court.67 Only one 
state, Georgia, explicitly forbids its municipalities from filing for 
bankruptcy.68 The remaining states have statutes that range widely 
in permissiveness. Some allow their municipalities free access to 
the courts, while others require the approval of various state 
officials before filing.69 Louisiana falls on the restrictive end of the 
spectrum, requiring approval from the State Bond Commission 
before a municipality can file a petition in bankruptcy court.70 
The fourth and fifth requirements are designed to promote 
good faith on the part of the municipality.71 The fourth requirement 
is that the municipality must “desire[] to effect a plan to adjust [its] 
debts.”72 Basically, this condition ensures the municipality is not 
simply evading its creditors or buying time to repay its debts.73 The 
fifth requirement imposes an obligation on the municipality to 
attempt to negotiate a debt readjustment plan with its creditors.74  
If the municipality meets these requirements, it can file a 
petition, accompanied by a list of its creditors and a proposed debt 
reorganization plan.75 If the court accepts the petition, an automatic 
stay becomes effective, which prevents the collection of any of the 
                                                                                                             
 66. 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(2) (2006). The legislation was amended in 1994 to 
address the disagreement as to whether a municipality required express 
permission to file or if simply not being prohibited from doing so was sufficient. 
Congress ended the debate by requiring specific authorization by states. See 
Freyberg, supra note 9, at 1006–09.  
 67. See Freyberg, supra note 9, at 1008–9, nn. 66–70. 
 68. GA. CODE ANN. § 36-80-5 (Westlaw 2011). 
 69. See Freyberg, supra note 9, at 1008–16. 
 70. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:4741 (2006); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
39:1410.64 (2005). 
 71. 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(4) (2006); 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(5) (2006). 
 72. 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(4) (2006). 
 73. COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 900.02(2)(d) (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. 
Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2011). 
 74. 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(5) (2006). There are four possible negotiation 
scenarios contemplated by the legislation. First, and most ideally, the 
municipality will successfully negotiate a debt plan with its creditors. Second, in 
the event that the municipality does not obtain the consent of its creditors, as 
long as it has negotiated in good faith, the municipality will be able to submit its 
plan. Third, if the court deems negotiations to be impracticable, then the 
municipality does not have to obtain creditor consent. Finally, if the 
municipality reasonably believes it will reach an agreement with its creditors 
during the bankruptcy proceeding, the court will accept the municipality’s 
petition. COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 900.02(2)(e) (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. 
Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2011). 
 75. 11 U.S.C. § 941 (2006). 




municipality’s debt obligations during the court proceedings.76 
Once the court confirms the final debt readjustment plan, the 
municipality is discharged from bankruptcy.77 
B. Pros and Cons of Chapter 9  
Although Chapter 9 can provide hope to a municipality that 
cannot meet its debt obligations using conventional methods, it 
also brings a host of potential adverse consequences that can affect 
not only the municipality, but also its neighboring cities and the 
state. For this reason, a municipality should carefully weigh all of 
its options before choosing bankruptcy. 
1. Benefits of Chapter 9 
The automatic stay of Chapter 9 is perhaps its greatest 
benefit.78 All collection actions, including those by the 
municipality’s own officials and residents, are suspended once the 
court accepts its petition.79 This affords some breathing room 
within which municipal officials can effectively reorganize the 
debt.80 Another benefit of Chapter 9 is that only one class of 
creditors needs to approve the proposed debt readjustment plan for 
the court to confirm it.81 As long as the plan is “fair and equitable” 
and one class of creditors accepts it, the judge can “cram down” 
the plan onto all other creditors.82 Thus the tables are turned on the 
creditors who are now in a relatively weaker bargaining position 
than the municipality.  
                                                                                                             
 76. 11 U.S.C. § 922 (2006). 
 77. 11 U.S.C. § 945 (2006). 
 78. Although the automatic stay is an established element of Chapter 9, one 
of Vallejo’s creditors filed a motion in 2010 to counter the automatic stay. The 
creditor argued that revenue from the city’s credit enhancement program (motor 
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Duffy, One Towns [sic] Bankruptcy Could Spread to Bond Market, 
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Sept. 1, 2010. 
 79. 11 U.S.C. § 922 (2006). 
 80. See JEWELER, supra note 59, at 6. 
 81. Id. at 9. A “class of creditors” is a group of creditors entitled to similar 
treatment in a bankruptcy case. 
 82. The statute provides that: 
[I]f all of the applicable requirements . . . are met with respect to a plan, 
the court, on request of the proponent of the plan, shall confirm the plan 
. . . if the plan does not discriminate unfairly, and is fair and equitable, 
with respect to each class of claims or interests that is impaired under, 
and has not accepted, the plan. 
11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1) (2006). Chapter 9 incorporates the “cram down” 
provision of Chapter 11. See 11 U.S.C. § 901(a) (2006). 




As a result of Tenth Amendment considerations, the 
municipality also retains significant governing powers for the 
duration of a Chapter 9 proceeding.83 Most significantly, there is 
no provision for a liquidation of its assets.84 As a result, the court 
cannot force a municipality to sell its police car or fire truck 
inventory in order to pay its debts.85 Because a municipality must 
provide basic safety and health services both during and after the 
bankruptcy proceeding, it would be nonsensical to liquidate the 
very assets needed to provide such services. Furthermore, the 
municipality can raise taxes and take on additional loans as 
administrative expenses, which is particularly useful if it has no 
remaining assets.86 Finally, as opposed to a Chapter 11 proceeding 
where the judge controls most aspects of a business’s affairs, the 
court has a relatively hands-off role in a Chapter 9 proceeding.87 
The presiding judge’s duties consist of approving the initial 
petition, confirming the proposed debt readjustment plan, and 
overseeing the implementation of the approved plan.88 If the new 
debt plan cannot be implemented or confirmed, the court does not 
have any power to force it upon the municipality.89  
2. Possible Adverse Effects of a Chapter 9 Proceeding 
Although Chapter 9 provides significant benefits to a 
struggling municipality, there are counterbalancing effects it 
should consider. First, bankruptcy can be the worst neighborhood 
eyesore imaginable.90 Given the choice, most people would not 
choose to live in a failing city.91 For example, many of the citizens 
and businesses of Vallejo, California left town as a result of the 
City’s bankruptcy.92 The City is now offering guided bus tours of 
foreclosed homes to anyone with a loan pre-qualification letter and 
                                                                                                             
 83. See Freyberg, supra note 9, at 1001; see also JEWELER, supra note 59, at 
2–3, 7. 
 84. COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 900.01(1) (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. 
Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2011). 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at ¶ 900.01(2); see also Grzeskowiak, supra note 12 (quoting Dan 
Miller, City Controller of Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, who opined that bankruptcy 
is a better option in the long-term because the city can retain revenue-producing 
assets). 
 87. Id. at ¶ 900.01(2)(c). 
 88. Id. at ¶ 900.01(1); Kimhi, supra note 1, at 375. 
 89. Id. at ¶ 900.01(1). 
 90. Kimhi, supra note 1, at 382. 
 91. Id. at 352; Lyndee Kemmet, Detroit Should Avoid Bankruptcy, DETROIT 
NEWS, Sept. 9, 2009, at A15. 
 92. See Avery, supra note 2. 




a driver’s license.93 This is a terrible scenario for Vallejo; however, 
the alternative option may not have yielded much better results. 
Municipal governments can raise taxes and cut services, but there 
is a point at which this course of action becomes 
counterproductive. Residents and businesses may choose to 
relocate to more affordable areas, which will then decrease the 
municipality’s tax base.94  
Many analysts also argue that bankruptcy will cause 
irreversible damage to a municipality’s bond rating and ability to 
obtain future credit.95 In 2010, Fitch Ratings threatened to 
downgrade the credit rating of municipalities that even discussed a 
Chapter 9 option.96 Furthermore, a Chapter 9 filing may also 
adversely affect neighboring cities and the state as a whole.97 
Because a state is strongly tied to its municipalities’ financial 
management, the failure of one city could make the entire state 
look fiscally incompetent.98 Indeed, the bond rating agencies also 
threatened to downgrade the state’s credit rating if any of its 
municipalities file for Chapter 9.99 This contagion effect is a 
significant concern of state officials nationwide.100  
Although a bankruptcy proceeding will probably degrade a 
municipality’s bond rating in the short term,101 there is no proof it 
will significantly affect a municipality’s ability to obtain loans in 
the future.102 In fact, there are examples that indicate the opposite 
                                                                                                             
 93. Id. 
 94. Kimhi, supra note 2, at 658. The municipality’s tax base is its primary 
source of revenue. See supra note 3. 
 95. See Kimhi, supra note 1, at 383–4. 
 96. See Benvenutti, et al., supra note 25, at 1. A downgraded credit rating 
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reasonable interest rates. Miller, supra note 11. 
 97. See Kimhi, supra note 1, at 382–3; Smith, supra note 8, at 521. 
 98. Interview with John Kennedy, Louisiana State Treasurer, in Baton 
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 99. See Kimhi, supra note 1, at 383. 
 100. The chief economist for the Los Angeles County Economic 
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Michigan Citizens Research Council opined that a Chapter 9 proceeding would 
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difficulty selling bonds and accessing the credit markets. Kaffer, supra note 28, 
at 17. 
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result.103 For instance, Orange County, California obtained a 
respectable AA rating within months of its bankruptcy.104 Such 
cases suggest the credit markets are receptive to municipalities that 
have successfully rehabilitated themselves following a Chapter 9 
proceeding.105 
Inarguably, a Chapter 9 proceeding itself is very expensive and 
can drain precious remaining municipal assets.106 The debtor 
counsel for the small town of Westfall, Pennsylvania opined that 
despite being a debtor in perhaps the most straightforward Chapter 
9 case imaginable (there was only one creditor and no subsequent 
appeal) the town was charged over $600,000 in attorney and 
accountant fees.107 Bankruptcy proceedings involving large 
municipalities with multiple creditors and subsequent appeals 
would surely dwarf that sum.108  
There are good reasons why most economists and scholars say 
bankruptcy should be an option of last resort.109 It is very 
expensive and can cause short-term damage to the economic 
reputation of the municipality, as well as the state as a whole.110 
However, despite these drawbacks, Chapter 9 has numerous 
benefits and can be the saving grace for a municipality in distress. 
If denied the opportunity to file for bankruptcy, the municipality’s 
problems will not go away on their own. The local government 
will be forced to raise taxes and cut services excessively, which 
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can have a deleterious effect on its neighboring cities and the 
state.111 Therefore, it is prudent to make municipal bankruptcy a 
viable option for municipalities that have no other feasible course 
of action left.  
IV. THE STATE “LEVEE”: LOUISIANA’S LAWS ON DEBT AND 
BANKRUPTCY 
Louisiana enacted a series of laws designed to prevent local 
government fiscal crises from arising and to help manage such 
emergencies when they do occur. The State is involved in every 
step of the municipal financial management process—from 
creating a budget to filing for bankruptcy. The current legislation 
has been relatively effective as demonstrated by respectable bond 
ratings and a dearth of municipal bankruptcies.112  
A. Budget and Debt Requirements 
Louisiana municipalities have a statutory obligation to 
maintain a balanced budget.113 The State considers fiscal 
responsibility so important that it has imposed criminal penalties 
on local government officials that knowingly or intentionally 
violate the balanced budget requirement.114 Thus from the outset, 
                                                                                                             
 111. See discussion infra Part V.C.4. 
 112. See BUREAU OF GOV’T RESEARCH & THE PUB. AFFAIRS RESEARCH 
COUNCIL OF LA.,, supra note 40, at 4; see also Credit Ratings of the State of 
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of-credit-rating-600024555 (last visited Nov. 8, 2011) (Louisiana had a credit 
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any parish or municipality shall in no case exceed the estimated income of the 
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expenditures shall not exceed the total of estimated funds available for the 
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 114. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39:1315 (2005) (“[A]ny public official or officer 
that violates, either knowingly or intentionally, the provisions of R.S. 
39:1305(E), either through the adoption of an original budget or through 
amendment to a legally adopted budget, shall be a violation of R.S. 14:134 and 
shall be subject to the penalties contained therein.”); see also Grant v. Grace, 
858 So. 2d 542, 544–5 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2003), rev’d on other grounds, 870 So. 
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legislate a sound budget.”). 




municipalities are responsible for forecasting estimated revenues 
and expenditures to ensure that the numbers balance.  
To further ensure that municipalities maintain balanced 
budgets, the State Bond Commission must approve all municipal 
debt before it is incurred.115 If approved, the State Bond 
Commission continually monitors the debt to ensure it is timely 
repaid.116 Thus the State carefully scrutinizes and monitors all 
voluntarily incurred municipal debt. Municipalities, however, often 
incur involuntary debt as a result of natural disaster damage, court 
judgments, and fiscal mismanagement.117 This kind of debt is 
usually unforeseeable and thus cannot be effectively predicted or 
prevented by the municipality. 
B. Fiscal Crisis—Appointment of the Fiscal Administrator 
The Louisiana Legislature enacted several laws in 1990 that 
enable state intervention if a municipality’s fiscal stability is in 
jeopardy.118 Upon a showing that a local government cannot pay 
its debts, the state legislative auditor, attorney general, and 
treasurer will publicly convene to review the struggling 
municipality’s financial situation.119 If the three decide that 
revenues are insufficient to meet outstanding debts, the attorney 
general will file a rule to appoint a fiscal administrator to take over 
the local government’s finances.120 If the court finds that the local 
government is “reasonably certain to fail to make a debt service 
payment or reasonably certain to not have sufficient revenue to pay 
current expenditures,” it will appoint a fiscal administrator.121  
The newly appointed fiscal administrator investigates the 
financial situation of the municipality and reports his findings to 
the state treasurer, attorney general, and legislative auditor.122 This 
written report contains the expected revenue and obligations for 
the remainder of the fiscal year, recommended amendments to the 
budget to ensure payment of the debt, the estimated deficit in the 
budget, and a recommendation of whether the local government 
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should be allowed to file for Chapter 9 bankruptcy.123 A week after 
the local government receives the report, it must vote on the fiscal 
administrator’s recommended budget changes.124 If it fails to adopt 
the recommended changes, the attorney general must ask the court 
to compel the local government to accept them.125 Once the new 
budget is enacted, the fiscal administrator monitors the 
municipality until he determines that it is fiscally healthy enough 
to meet its obligations for the current and upcoming years.126 At 
that point, the attorney general, local government officials, or the 
fiscal administrator himself can move to terminate his 
appointment.127 
C. Fiscal Emergency—Access to Chapter 9 Bankruptcy 
Although the local government may agree with the fiscal 
administrator’s recommendation to pursue Chapter 9 bankruptcy, it 
does not have the power to file on its own volition.128 The 
legislature enacted two statutes addressing bankruptcy filings to 
ensure that the petition is neither filed by the municipality nor 
accepted by the court without State approval.129 The original 
statute enacted in 1937 concerns judicial procedure.130 Louisiana 
Revised Statutes section 13:4741 forbids Louisiana bankruptcy 
courts from receiving a Chapter 9 petition from any “parish, 
municipality, political subdivision, public board or public 
corporation, taxing district, or other agency of the state” without 
written approval from the State Bond Commission.131 In 1990, the 
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 129. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:4741 (2006 & Supp. 2011); LA. REV. STAT. 
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indicated supra in Part III.A.2, specificity as to what municipalities are included 
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as a municipality under Chapter 9. There has not yet been a controversy over the 
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should clarify the issue. See infra note 133 (citing Louisiana Revised Statutes 
sections 39:1410.64 and 39:1410.60). 




legislature enacted a somewhat duplicative statute, which 
specifically applies to municipalities.132 Louisiana Revised Statutes 
section 39:1410.64 prohibits municipalities from filing without 
written approval from the State Bond Commission.133 At first 
glance, these approval requirements may seem insignificant, but 
the State Bond Commission is actually an extremely powerful state 
body.  
Created in 1968, the State Bond Commission manages the debt 
of the State and its municipalities.134 The Commission is 
comprised of the governor, lieutenant governor, president of the 
senate, speaker of the house, treasurer, secretary of state, attorney 
general, and chairmen of several senate and house committees.135 
After reviewing the municipality’s petition, the State Bond 
Commission members (or their designated representatives) vote to 
authorize the Chapter 9 filing.136 Their decision is final and there is 
no appeals process if the filing is denied.137 
If a municipality succeeds in obtaining the State Bond 
Commission’s approval to file, it faces an additional hurdle before 
it can submit its debt readjustment plan to the court. Louisiana 
Revised Statutes sections 39:1410.64 and 39:619 require the 
written approval from the State Bond Commission, governor, and 
attorney general before the court can accept the proposed plan.138 
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 133. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39:1410.64 (2005). Affected entities include 
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 138. Louisiana Revised Statutes section 39:1410.64 requires State Bond 
Commission approval prior to a municipality putting a debt readjustment plan 
into effect or seeking its final confirmation. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39:1410.64 
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its debts” or petitioning for a confirmation of the plan without written approval 




By enacting these duplicative and exacting laws, the Louisiana 
Legislature severely limited a municipality’s ability to file for 
bankruptcy.  
V. A LEAK IN THE STATE “LEVEE”: PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT 
LAW 
The problem with the current law is that in trying to be 
prudent, the Louisiana Legislature made municipal bankruptcy a 
virtual impossibility instead of an option of last resort.139 It appears 
the Legislature wanted municipalities to pursue Chapter 9 only 
after careful consideration and a thorough analysis of all potential 
options.140 But a closer look at the effects of the legislation reveals 
that the State Bond Commission approval requirement is “a 
significant hurdle for any local governmental entity contemplating 
bankruptcy.”141 For a municipality saddled with crippling debt, this 
hurdle appears insurmountable. 
A. A Virtual Non-Option 
The State’s stance on municipal bankruptcy has consistently 
been that its disadvantages outweigh any advantages it might have 
for a local government in financial crisis.142 Even during the 
widespread financial emergency caused by Hurricanes Katrina and 
Rita, the State was adamant in its assertion that it would not 
consider allowing its political subdivisions to file for 
bankruptcy.143 Given the lack of other viable options, the Public 
Affairs Research Council of Louisiana implored the State to either 
accept additional federal funding or open up its own coffers to 
assist the struggling municipalities.144 The State eventually 
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accepted federal assistance, but it has remained adamant that it will 
not entertain municipal bankruptcy petitions.145 
The Chairman of the State Bond Commission put another nail 
in the coffin of municipal bankruptcy when he made a 
“commitment to the rating agencies and bond insurers that he will 
not vote to allow any municipality in the state to enter into 
bankruptcy.”146 The Chairman surely intended to benefit the State 
with such promises.147 In light of the rating agencies’ tendency to 
downgrade municipal bond ratings at the mere mention of the word 
“bankruptcy,” it is understandable for the State to display open 
hostility toward Chapter 9. However, these words also have the 
effect of virtually eliminating the option for municipalities in 
financial crisis.148 
B. Political Nature of the State Bond Commission 
The main problem with the approval requirement lies in the 
controversy over municipal bankruptcy and the political nature of 
the State Bond Commission. Most politicians revile Chapter 9 due 
to its stigma and potential to ruin political careers.149 Not many 
politicians would openly advocate bankruptcy for fear of backlash 
at the polls. Although there are no proven long-term effects of 
municipal bankruptcy, politicians will inevitably take the blame for 
the short-term effects on the municipality’s neighbors and the 
State.150 As a result, state politicians focused on the next election 
might overlook the fact that bankruptcy could benefit the 
municipality and the State in the long run.151 By leaving the 
decision to approve a bankruptcy filing in the hands of a powerful 
group of politicians, politics, rather than prudent policy, is likely to 
be the primary influence.  
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Interest groups also play a significant role in a politician’s 
decision-making process.152 At the state level, interest groups may 
represent creditors and other groups opposed to a municipal 
bankruptcy proceeding.153 Because Chapter 9 puts municipal 
creditors in a position of relative weakness as compared to the 
local government, these interest groups would certainly lobby state 
officials on the State Bond Commission to reject any bankruptcy 
petition. The problem is that these groups generally promote their 
own interests without considering the effects their requests will 
have on the municipality or the State as a whole.154  
The members of the State Bond Commission are also 
motivated by different issues that can prevent them from making 
decisions that are in the best interest of a municipality in crisis. 
The legislative branch members have their particular constituents 
in mind while the executive branch members are concerned with 
the State as a whole. These diverging interests actually have the 
same effect on the members’ decision-making process. The 
legislative members are not likely to vote for a bankruptcy 
proceeding in another voting district that may adversely affect their 
constituents. Similarly, the executive members would be reluctant 
to relieve one municipality’s suffering at the expense of the State. 
In both instances, allowing the municipality to file for Chapter 9 
could hurt the politicians at the polls.155 State politicians rarely 
receive political benefits (votes and campaign support) for helping 
one particular town or parish in trouble.156 In fact, there can be 
considerable backlash for supporting a municipal bankruptcy.157 
This is not the kind of publicity the members of the State Bond 
Commission are looking for and it is bound to weigh on their 
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C. Inherent Problems in the Political Process 
There is also inherent delay and conflict in the political process 
that can make municipal bankruptcy unavailable when it is needed 
most.158 Because it is a last resort option, the residents of a 
municipality in crisis can suffer from a lack of services and 
exorbitant taxes for a considerable amount of time before the local 
government pursues Chapter 9. Instead of gaining access to the 
benefits of Chapter 9 that would immediately relieve some of their 
burden, the people will continue to suffer while the State 
deliberates the municipality’s petition. And because it appears that 
the State Bond Commission is unlikely to authorize a filing, the 
municipality’s problems may continue for the foreseeable future.  
Some might argue that the people should bear the risk of 
municipal insolvency because they are in a position to prevent it by 
virtue of their vote.159 This argument overlooks the fact that 
despite the political process, the municipality’s citizens cannot 
control the government’s financial situation.160 Once their ballots 
have been cast, citizens are limited in their ability to affect political 
decisions. Furthermore, the people are completely powerless to 
prevent financial crises arising from involuntary debt as a result of 
natural disaster damage, court judgments, and the like. To demand 
that the people bear the burden indefinitely because they were 
supposedly in a position to prevent the crisis runs contrary to the 
reality of the situation.161 Because the people were not at fault, 
they should not be forced to suffer the consequences alone.  
D. Lack of Ex Ante Features 
The lack of statutory guidance for its decision-making process 
exacerbates the effects of the political nature and inherent bias of 
the State Bond Commission.162 The Legislature did not establish 
any list of factors or other criteria for the State Bond Commission 
to consider in determining whether the municipality should be 
permitted to file.163 The decision is entirely at the whim of the 
State Bond Commission. Furthermore, there is no requirement for 
a written justification of its decision nor is there a process for 
appealing a rejection.  
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The Civil law system of Louisiana generally embraces the ex 
ante statutory structure.164 Such laws seek to provide general 
guidance and solutions before considering the facts of a given 
situation. Many Louisiana statutes are consistent with ex ante 
drafting and include criteria and factors for the courts to consider 
in deciding cases.165 The result of this guidance is greater 
predictability in the outcome of a legal decision and stability in the 
jurisprudence over the course of time. Under the current law, a 
municipality will have no guess as to how the State Bond 
Commission will decide—aside from some members declaring 
they will never approve a filing.166 
VI. BLUEPRINT FOR THE NEW “LEVEE”: PROPOSED AMENDMENTS 
TO THE LAW 
In order to revitalize the municipal bankruptcy option, the 
decision to file should be placed in the hands of a politically 
disinterested yet intimately involved and knowledgeable person. 
Using legislative guidelines, this person would draw from his in-
depth analysis of the municipality and his financial expertise to 
determine whether bankruptcy is the best solution. This ideal 
person is the fiscal administrator.  
Because the current law does not tie the fiscal administrator to 
the municipal bankruptcy process other than requiring him to 
recommend whether the municipality should be permitted to file 
for Chapter 9, some legislative changes are necessary. First, 
Louisiana Revised Statutes sections 13:4741 and 39:1410.64 
should be amended to require review and approval from a state-
appointed fiscal administrator as a prerequisite for filing. The state 
government will retain the power of appointment, but the decision 
to file will be passed from the State Bond Commission to the fiscal 
administrator.167 Second, the Legislature should enact guidelines to 
assist the fiscal administrator in his decision to authorize a filing 
and to ensure he considers the interests of the State.168 
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A. Fiscal Administrator’s Power to Authorize a Chapter 9 Filing 
The Fiscal Administrator is the proper person to authorize a 
municipal bankruptcy proceeding. First, the Fiscal Administrator is 
not a politician, so the political ramifications of a Chapter 9 
proceeding will not influence his decision to file. Second, the 
Fiscal Administrator is the most knowledgeable person to make the 
decision given the fact that he has immersed himself in the 
municipality’s financial situation. Third, unlike state politicians 
who must split their efforts and time among all areas of the State, 
the Fiscal Administrator is focused solely on the municipality in 
crisis. Lastly, the Fiscal Administrator is accountable to the State 
and the municipality for his decisions, which ensures a proper 
degree of governmental oversight. 
1. Non-Political Figure 
Unlike the members of the State Bond Commission who are 
elected officials, the fiscal administrator is not concerned with the 
political implications of a bankruptcy filing. As explained above, 
state politicians are not likely to make decisions that would 
jeopardize their chances for reelection.169 Although cognizant of 
the near-term effects of a municipal bankruptcy filing, the fiscal 
administrator is more focused on taking actions that will benefit 
the municipality and the State in the long run.170 Because he does 
not have a constituency or a political reputation to protect, the 
fiscal administrator can make politically unpopular decisions that 
will benefit the municipality and the State past the next election.   
Moreover, the fiscal administrator is not influenced by 
creditors and interest groups in his decision-making process. 
Because he has no incentive to make decisions in line with their 
agenda, he is free from the pressures normally exerted on state 
officials.171 For example, if inconsequential government jobs 
should be cut, the fiscal administrator will not be swayed by 
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protests or other organized efforts that might be effective against 
politicians. Thus, the fiscal administrator can focus on determining 
the best solutions for the municipality without being subjected to 
external political pressures.172 
Permitting the fiscal administrator to authorize a municipal 
bankruptcy filing would not amount to a radical change in the law. 
The State has already made the policy decision to intervene in 
municipal affairs during financial crises. The current law grants the 
fiscal administrator significant power to make budgetary decisions 
on behalf of the local government. The State then enforces the 
fiscal administrator’s recommendations through the court if the 
municipality does not voluntarily adopt them.173 The justification 
for this intervention is that the municipality is deemed incapable of 
solving its problems on its own and thus requires state assistance. 
The State vested significant powers in the fiscal administrator with 
the intent that he will cure the municipality’s insolvency; therefore, 
the authority to permit a Chapter 9 filing—also intended to remedy 
insolvency—is a logical extension of the fiscal administrator’s 
power under the current law.  
2. Most Knowledgeable of the Municipality’s Situation 
The fiscal administrator is arguably the most knowledgeable 
person regarding the municipality’s financial situation. As a result 
of his statutory responsibilities, the fiscal administrator will 
become intimately acquainted with the municipality’s finances.174 
His principal duty is to conduct a comprehensive investigation of 
the municipality’s financial affairs.175 He has unfettered access to 
municipal documents and records and can interrogate municipal 
officials as he deems necessary.176 Once he has fully analyzed the 
municipality’s situation and determined how it arrived at its 
current predicament, he then decides what steps must be taken in 
order to get the municipality back to fiscal health. The municipal 
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officials technically have the option to reject the fiscal 
administrator’s proposals; however, the statute dictates that the 
attorney general must ask the court to order the implementation if 
the proposals are rejected.177 After the new budget is in place, the 
fiscal administrator continues to monitor the municipality’s 
progress.178 In sum, the fiscal administrator analyzes the situation 
in depth, pinpoints the budgetary problems, corrects them, and 
observes the new procedures in action. Thus, he is now in the best 
position to forecast the economic future of the municipality to 
determine if filing for bankruptcy under Chapter 9 is necessary. 
4. Total Focus on the Municipality’s Situation 
The fiscal administrator is also in the best position to make the 
decision because he is completely devoted to analyzing the 
problem and devising a solution. Unlike the members of the State 
Bond Commission who have numerous other duties to perform, the 
fiscal administrator is consumed with solving the municipality’s 
problems. An appointment can last anywhere from six months to 
several years.179 Certainly none of the State Bond Commission 
members could afford to spend a few weeks, much less several 
months, in the affected city. With this immersion comes a true 
appreciation for the situation and the people affected by the crisis. 
The fiscal administrator is the best person to authorize the filing 
because he in essence has become part of the municipality. 
5. Accountability  
Some may question the power of a fiscal administrator because 
he is not an elected official. Indeed, concerns have been raised 
about the appointment of a fiscal administrator to a home rule 
entity without its consent.180 These fears should be allayed by the 
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fact that the Legislature took pains to clarify under what 
circumstances a fiscal administrator will be appointed.181 The court 
must determine that the municipality is either reasonably certain to 
fail to pay its debts or does not have sufficient funds to pay for its 
current expenditures.182 Once appointed, the fiscal administrator is 
not an unimpeachable figure. Both the State and the municipality 
can request the court to terminate his appointment.183 Furthermore, 
any showing of fraud, negligence, or misconduct is grounds for 
termination.184 Thus, the fiscal administrator is accountable to the 
State, the municipality, and the court for his actions, ensuring that 
he operates within the bounds of his legislative authority.   
B. Statutory Guidance  
1. Who Should the Fiscal Administrator Be? 
With the proposed amendment, the fiscal administrator’s 
appointment becomes more significant and should therefore be 
reconsidered. The State should choose the most qualified 
individual to ensure that he is capable of handling the monumental 
task of analyzing a municipality’s budget and identifying and 
fixing its financial problems. Currently the law simply states that 
the court must determine that the individual has the requisite 
“education, experience and qualifications to enable him to perform 
the duties of fiscal administrator.”185 The Legislature should 
establish additional guidelines for the selection of the fiscal 
administrator. First, the fiscal administrator should not be an 
elected official to ensure that he is free from political bias. Second, 
he should be an expert in government finances. Therefore the 
Legislature should provide an illustrative list of qualified 
individuals, including certified public accountants with experience 
in government finances and former bankruptcy judges.186 These 
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additional qualifications provide more substantive guidance and 
help ensure that the State appoints the most qualified person. 
The State should also consider the proposed fiscal 
administrator’s residence in relation to the municipality. Because 
the local government is responsible for paying the fiscal 
administrator, the Legislature should ensure that its financial 
burden is as small as possible.187 The fiscal administrator’s travel 
expenses will be borne by the municipality, so his residence should 
be no more than 50 miles away.188 If it is impossible to find a 
qualified person within this distance, the court may authorize a 
reasonable extension of this radius. 
2. Guidelines to Assist the Fiscal Administrator 
The Legislature should establish guidelines to assist the fiscal 
administrator in his decision-making process to ensure that he 
authorizes a filing in accordance with the State’s interests. The 
fiscal administrator must adhere to these guidelines and provide 
written justification for filing along with his approval. The court 
will review the fiscal administrator’s reasoning to ensure that he 
has approved the filing in accordance with the legislative guidance.  
First, a Chapter 9 filing should be authorized only under certain 
circumstances. How the municipality arrived at its current financial 
crisis should be a determining factor. A critical distinction should 
be made between voluntary and involuntary debt.189 A 
municipality that voluntarily takes on debt and then fails to repay 
its creditors through its own misfeasance should rarely be 
permitted to take advantage of Chapter 9. Voluntary debt thus 
weighs heavily against a municipal bankruptcy filing. However, in 
most cases, the fiscal administrator will correct such budget 
mismanagement through adoption of his budgetary amendments.190 
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Therefore, financial crises caused by voluntary debt mismanagement 
will usually not require the fiscal administrator to even consider 
bankruptcy as a solution.  
Debt that is incurred involuntarily, such as by natural disaster, 
a large monetary court judgment, or criminal malfeasance in 
office, justifies the municipality getting favorable treatment over 
its creditors.191 Because the municipality incurred the debt through 
no fault of its own, the fiscal administrator may consider 
bankruptcy under the following three circumstances. First, if the 
fiscal crisis is caused by a natural disaster and neither the federal 
nor state government provides sufficient assistance to cover the 
municipality’s debt, the filing may be authorized.192 Second, if 
there is a significant judgment assessed against the municipality, 
the fiscal administrator may authorize a filing if (1) the appeals 
process has been exhausted, and (2) the local government 
attempted to negotiate a settlement in good faith.193 Finally, if the 
municipality’s financial problems are attributed to criminal actions 
of a local government official, the fiscal administrator may permit 
a Chapter 9 filing.194 There may be other circumstances under 
which a municipality experiences a financial crisis due to 
involuntary debt. The fiscal administrator may authorize a filing in 
such a case, but must provide written reasons for his decision.  
In addition to meeting one of these threshold requirements, the 
fiscal administrator must also determine that bankruptcy is the only 
remaining viable option for the municipality. The State is 
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obviously very concerned with keeping bankruptcy as a last resort 
option.195 To meet the State’s intent, the fiscal administrator should 
authorize the filing only if all other options have been exhausted or 
no other reasonable course of action remains. Through his 
examination of the municipality’s budget, the fiscal administrator 
must make the following determinations. First, the fiscal 
administrator must certify that taxes have been raised to the highest 
level possible without creating an unreasonable burden on the 
citizens, and that all revenue-producing assets are utilized to their 
maximum capacity.196 In addition, the fiscal administrator must 
justify any non-essential services that have not been cut from the 
budget.197 Although it is unlikely, the fiscal administrator must 
inquire into the possibility of borrowing more money. If the 
municipality’s credit rating has not dropped so far as to prevent it 
from obtaining additional loans, then it must pursue that option if 
feasible and in its best interests. If all possible revenues have been 
raised, all possible expenses have been cut, the municipality cannot 
obtain additional loans, and there is still a deficit that will not be 
extinguished within the following fiscal year, then the fiscal 
administrator may authorize a Chapter 9 filing. 
C. Benefits of the Proposed Legislation 
Empowering the fiscal administrator to authorize a Chapter 9 
bankruptcy filing streamlines the entire financial crisis procedure 
and ensures that if the municipality opts for bankruptcy, it is truly a 
well-thought-out decision. State involvement is now centralized in 
one person—the person who is in the best position to make such a 
decision. The process for handling municipal financial crises will 
be more efficient because the fiscal administrator has the authority 
to choose whatever course of action is in the best interest of the 
municipality, including a Chapter 9 filing. The roadblock of 
obtaining approval from the State Bond Commission is removed 
from the chosen path to recovery. Once the fiscal administrator 
determines that bankruptcy is the most prudent option, the 
municipality may immediately take advantage of the benefits of 
Chapter 9. In this collection-free sanctuary, the municipality can 
more effectively negotiate with its creditors to develop the most 
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reasonable and advantageous debt readjustment plan possible. 
Most situations will not result in bankruptcy, but in the rare 
instance where the fiscal administrator decides that bankruptcy is 
the best option, allowing him to authorize the filing will provide 
more timely relief to the municipality drowning in debt.  
1. A Reduction in Municipal Bankruptcies 
One might assume that shifting the filing decision to the fiscal 
administrator will result in more bankruptcies. This conclusion 
overlooks the fact that in every instance where a Louisiana fiscal 
administrator took control of a municipality’s finances, the local 
government recovered from its fiscal crisis.198 For example, in 
2006, the State appointed a fiscal administrator to the small town 
of Glenmora in Rapides Parish after it had defaulted on a $204,990 
federal government loan.199 The fiscal administrator discovered the 
causes of the town’s anemic revenue, which included faulty utility 
billing, corruption, and traffic ticket fixing.200 After a year under 
the auspices of the fiscal administrator, the town was able to avoid 
bankruptcy after selling its hospital and a nursing home.201  
In 1992, a similar situation occurred when St. Landry Parish 
defaulted on its general obligation bonds amounting to $1.2 
million.202 As a result of a depressed oil and gas market, several 
municipalities in the area had also faced financial crunches yet 
managed to stay solvent by making difficult budget cuts.203 The 
Parish’s officials were unwilling to make similar cuts, leading the 
fiscal administrator to conclude that the local officials’ “lack of 
budget discipline” was the main cause of the fiscal crisis.204 After 
implementing the fiscal administrator’s recommended budget 
amendments, the Parish was able to avoid bankruptcy.205 History 
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suggests that the appointment of a fiscal administrator leads to 
fiscal recovery, not insolvency. This should reduce fears that the 
broadening of the fiscal administrator’s authority will lead to 
additional bankruptcy filings. 
2. Prevention of Repeat Bankruptcies 
There have been at least two municipalities nationwide that 
have emerged from bankruptcy only to find themselves back in 
Chapter 9 proceedings a few years later.206 Although recurring 
bankruptcies are certainly not the norm, they raise the question of 
whether Chapter 9 is effective as a long-term solution. The 
municipalities’ problem was that they emerged from Chapter 9 
without having addressed the causes of their fiscal crisis.207 
Chapter 9 does not solve underlying issues with a municipality’s 
financial management—that is something that the municipality 
will have to address on its own. In Louisiana, state intervention via 
the fiscal administrator prior to a bankruptcy filing helps prevent 
recurring financial crises. The fiscal administrator is solving not 
only the current financial emergency but also the core problems of 
the municipality’s financial management.208 Even if the 
municipality opts for Chapter 9, it is unlikely to experience 
financial crisis again because it has new budgetary procedures in 
place. 
3. Prevention of Hasty Filings 
The proposed amendment will also prevent municipalities from 
requesting permission to file for Chapter 9 as a knee-jerk reaction 
to financial crises. When a fiscal emergency arises suddenly, as a 
result of a natural disaster or large monetary judgment against the 
municipality, the officials’ instinct may be to seek bankruptcy 
before fully exploring their options. For example, when the Fifth 
Circuit awarded a $15 million judgment to a wrongly convicted 
death row inmate, the Orleans Parish District Attorney’s Office 
sought permission to file for bankruptcy within weeks of the 
verdict.209 The judgment equaled the Office’s total annual budget, 
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which understandably sent the district attorney into a panic.210 But 
following meetings with the state treasurer and attorney general, 
the district attorney withdrew his request three days later, most 
likely due to the state officials’ advice that his request would be 
rejected because the appeals process had not been exhausted.211 In 
times of fiscal crises like this one, a disinterested party, like a fiscal 
administrator, is better able to analyze the situation and make a 
decision based on reason rather than emotion. If a bankruptcy 
filing is ultimately authorized, it will be a result of careful thought 
and consideration. 
4. Prevention of Long Term Contagion Effects  
A final question remains about the justification of a Chapter 9 
filing. Because a bankruptcy may adversely affect neighboring 
municipalities as well as the State, how can the benefit to one 
municipality outweigh the detriment to others? The answer comes 
down to a balancing of near- and long-term state interests.  
Although a municipal bankruptcy may have a contagion effect 
on its neighbors and the State by temporarily downgrading their 
bond credit ratings, there may be long-term contagion effects that 
result from not allowing the municipality to pursue Chapter 9. For 
example, if a municipality is denied a Chapter 9 option, it has no 
choice but to increase taxes to unreasonable levels and cut services 
to try to repay its creditors.212 When police, prison and public 
hospital funds are cut to barebones levels, these service providers 
cannot properly function. Crime will rise, prisons will become 
overcrowded and dangerous, and the quality of hospital care will 
diminish. These problems will not be contained within the 
municipal boundaries. Neighboring towns will feel the 
consequences: crime levels may increase, prisoners from 
overcrowded prisons may be transferred to other parishes, and 
patients may be forced to find care at other hospitals. Furthermore, 
these effects may be felt much longer than the temporary decrease 
in the municipality’s credit rating. In the long run, it will benefit 
the State and its political subdivisions to afford a financially 
distressed municipality access to Chapter 9. Municipal bankruptcy 
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should not be embraced as a panacea, but it should remain 
available as an option of last resort. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
There is no question that Louisiana’s current municipal 
bankruptcy laws will deter municipalities from considering 
bankruptcy as an option. However, the law should not be aimed at 
preventing bankruptcy; rather it should seek to ensure that 
bankruptcy is chosen in only the direst of circumstances, when no 
other option exists. Municipal bankruptcy is not a preferable 
course of action. It can have severe consequences on both the 
municipality itself and the State. But there are times when 
bankruptcy is the best option for the local government and its 
people. It is possible that municipal crises will occur more 
frequently in the next decade. Louisiana may face times when 
more municipalities require the assistance of a fiscal administrator. 
Given such a possibility, it is wise to amend the legislation now so 
the procedures are as comprehensive and sensible as possible. In 
other words, it is better to fix the levee now before the next 
hurricane hits.  
Broadening the fiscal administrator’s authority to allow him to 
authorize a municipality to file for bankruptcy will ensure 
bankruptcy is chosen as a last resort. The shift in authority will 
also streamline the process, and in the instance that Chapter 9 is 
deemed necessary, it gives the municipality quicker access to the 
benefits of Chapter 9, most notably the automatic stay. To assist 
the fiscal administrator in his decision-making process, the 
Legislature should also enact guidelines and a set of conditions to 
be met before a bankruptcy petition can be filed. As a result of 
these amendments, a local government will receive 
comprehensive, impartial assistance from the fiscal administrator, 
who will have the power to pursue all options in order to put the 
municipality back into financial health. 
Louisiana’s municipalities have managed to overcome various 
financial crises without resorting to Chapter 9 bankruptcy. 
However, it is prudent to examine the current legislation to ensure 
that it properly meets the needs of Louisiana’s municipalities, 
especially in uncertain economic times. In 1986, the mayor of 
Tallulah “issued a proclamation asking God to help his financially 
devastated city.”213 The State can help prevent such desperation in 
                                                                                                             
 213. The City’s prayers were answered when a fiscal administrator was 
appointed to bring it back to fiscal health. A year later, the fiscal administrator 




the future by amending its laws to ensure that Chapter 9 
bankruptcy is a viable option for municipalities that have no hope 
of recovering on their own. 
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